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COMMENTS
DAMAGES IN WASHINGTON WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTIONS
At common law there was no right of recovery for wrongful death
and the cause of action for personal injuries did not survive the death
of either the injured person or the tort-feasor. In 1846 Lord Camp-
bell's Act1 was adopted, and not long thereafter wrongful death legis-
lation appeared in every state, patterned largely after the English
statute.
THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Wrongful death statute. The present Washington legislation2 cre-
ates a new cause of action on behalf of designated beneficiaries to
compensate them for the loss they suffer through the death of the de-
cedent. Procedurally the action is brought by the decedent's personal
representative, but the recovery is for the exclusive benefit of the stat-
utory beneficiaries and is not an asset of the decedent's estate.' This
cause of action survives the death of the tort-feasor.4
Survival statute. RCW 4.20.060 is a hybrid statute. Survival
statutes seek to redress the interest which a person has in his bodily
integrity and continued existence by perpetuating his cause of action
beyond his death. The Washington statute is peculiar in that it does
not perpetuate the decedent's cause of action for personal injuries
unless those injuries caused his death.' Consequently the operation of
this section is limited to the occurrence of a wrongful death.' Further-
more, the recovery is for the exclusive benefit of the statutory bene-
ficiaries, who are the same persons compensated under the wrongful
death statute, and this recovery is not an asset of the estate.' Proced-
I Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.2 RCW 4.20.005-.030. For a general survey see Brady, The Action-for Wrongful
Death in Washington, 4 WAsH. L. REv. 61 (1929).3 Koloff v. Chicago, M. & P.S. Ry., 71 Wash. 543, 129 Pac. 398 (1913) ; Archibald
v. Lincoln County, 50 Wash. 55, 96 Pac. 831 (1908) ; Copeland v. City of Seattle, 33
Wash. 415, 74 Pac. 582 (1903).
'RCW 4.20.045; See 28 WAsH. L. REV. 201 (1948).
5 Bland v. King County, 154 Wash. Dec. 632, 342 P.2d 599 (1959).6 Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros., 4 Wash. 783, 31 Pac. 329 (1892), which emascu-
lated RCW 4.20.040 is still applicable to abate a cause of action for personal injuries
when the injured person's death was not caused by those injuries.7 Creditors who have relied principally upon the debtor's earning capacity in ex-
tending credit find their most basic security impaired without protection from the statu-
tory reform. , 1'. A,i]
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urally, the action is brought by the decedent's personal representative.
The cause of action is independent from that under the wrongful death
statute and recoveries under both may be sustained, with or without
joinder of the actions.'
Child-death statute. RCW 4.24.010 allows a parent to bring an
action, as an individual and not in a representative capacity, for the
wrongful death of his child. To the extent that the parent is dependent
upon the deceased child for support, this section and the wrongful death
statute overlap and there is an election of remedies. The election should
usually be made in favor of suing under the wrongful death statute be-
cause of the possibility of a greater recovery due to the difference in
cut-off rates for measuring damages.9
The child death statute is not in the form of wrongful death legisla-
tion and has been the subject of individualized construction.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Statutory measure. The wrongful death statute includes within it
the general statement that "the jury may give such damages as, under
all circumstances of the case, may to them seem just."' ° This provision
has been quoted and emphasized in many cases but an appraisal of the
cases indicates that its principal utility has been in restatement by way
of supporting a decision which has already been reached." The exist-
ence of the language does not serve any useful function in statutory
construction since remedial legislation is invariably liberally con-
strued. 2 It is the author's view that Shead v. Riser," correctly spells
out the proper construction of this general statement, viz., that it is
only declarative of the jury's function in the absence of such a proviso
and consequently is not entitled to consideration in deciding a question
presented to the court. Thus it has been left to the courts to prescribe
the measure of damages under its interpretation of the basic theory of
the statute.
8 Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 181 Wash. 576, 44 P.2d 193 (1935) ; Whiting
v. City of Seattle, 144 Wash. 668, 258 Pac. 824 (1927) ; Machek v. City of Seattle, 118
Wash. 42, 203 Pac. 25 (1921).
9 See cases cited, in fra note 35.
10 RCW 4.20.020.
11 The provision has been used as support for: love and affection as a damage ele-
ment, Hinton v. Carmody, 182 Wash. 123, 45 P.2d 32 (1935) ; loss of society and com-
panionship as an element (contra to the holding under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act), Davis v. North Coast Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 295 Pac. 921 (1931) ; indi-
cating the court's control over the jury's verdict and the introduction of prejudicial
testimony, Clason v. Velguth, 168 Wash. 242, 11 P.2d 249 (1932).
"2 Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn.2d 419. 275 P.2d 723 (1954) (stating the rule of
liberal construction as applicable to the wrongful death statute).
"3 136 Wash. 270, 239 Pac. 562 (1925).
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Pecuniary loss. Some states have adopted, as the basic theory of
compensation under wrongful death legislation, the philosophy that the
decedent's estate should be compensated for the loss resulting from his
death. In Washington, and in the majority of states with statutes pat-
terned after Lord Campbell's Act, the basic theory is that of compen-
sating the deceased's survivors for the loss they have suffered by reason
of his death. The statutory beneficiaries who may recover under the
Washington wrongful death and survival statutes are all relatives of
the deceased; those who are more closely related being preferred by
not having to prove dependency upon the deceased."4 Consequently,
these statutes provide damages for injury to the interest which one
member of the family has by reason of his family relation to the in-
jured person."
The compensable loss suffered by the statutory beneficiaries has al-
ways been limited to pecuniary loss. "The action proceeds on the theory
of compensating the individual beneficiaries for loss of the economic
benefit which they might reasonably have expected to receive from the
decedent in the form of support, services or contributions during the
remainder of his lifetime if he had not been killed." [Emphasis
added] .'1 There can be no recovery for the survivor's grief or anguish"
nor can any award be made by way of solace to the survivor's affec-
tions.' Implicit in the concept of pecuniary loss to survivors is the
notion of a reasonably anticipated receipt from the decedent, if he had
lived, on which may be placed a monetary value. Consequently, a detri-
ment suffered by survivors which did not arise by reason of the de-
cedent's inability to confer a benefit is not within the measure of dam-
ages.'
In Clason v. Velguth,2 6 the admission of a widow's testimony that
she had no means of support since she was not qualified or trained in
any trade or occupation and had been entirely dependent upon her hus-
band as the bread-winner for a number of years, was held to be preju-
dicial error. The court noted that evidence of the statutory beneficiary's
14 But parents of the deceased must prove dependency in order to recover under the
wrongful death statute; contra under the child-death statute with regard to minor
children.
15 McCoaacxc, DAMAGES § 98 (1935).
'6PRossmi, TORTS at 713 (2d ed. 1935).
'7 Penoza v. Northern Pac. R. RL, 215 Fed. 200 (W.D. Wash. 1914); Walker v.
McNeill, 17 Wash. 582, 50 Pac. 518 (1897).
18 Pearson v. Picht 184 Wash. 607, 52 P2d 314 (1935), but see cases cited, infra
note 21.
iD Allen v. Hart, 32 Wn.2d 173, 201 P.2d 145 (1948) (no compensation for sur-
vivor's lost wages).20168 Wash. 242, 11 P2d 249 (1932).
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condition or circumstances that lends no aid in determining the char-
acter or value of the anticipated receipt from the decedent is imma-
terial to the issue at hand and may be prejudicial because of its prob-
able effect on the jury.21 Consequently, evidence of the beneficiary's
earning capacity or financial resources is not properly introduced. An
illustration of this concept is that of the decedent who has left his fam-
ily in a comfortable financial position. Of course his survivors should
not be penalized for his prudence; quite to the contrary, their reason-
able expectations of support and assistance are considerably greater in
scope than the average and logically should result in a greater award.
The Clason case also approved the proposition that it was proper to
prove that the deceased was his survivor's sole means of support during
his life, although it was not proper to show the financial circumstances
of the survivor. This dictum may be subject to criticism. When valuing
the reasonably expected contributions by the decedent which have been
lost to his survivor because of the untimely death, is it material to know
the degree to which the survivor depended upon the decedent for sup-
port? It seems that the amount of support which the survivor had a
reasonable expectation of receiving from the decedent in the future is
the critical issue. Partial dependence on a high-income producer might
result in a greater economic loss than total dependence on a low-income
producer.
Elements of damage. The elements of damage commonly stated in
instructions where a parent has died are loss of: daily services, atten-
tion, and care; physical, moral, and intellectual instruction and train-
ing; comforts, conveniences, and education; advice; nurture; protec-
tion; love; guidance; support; earnings; and maintenance. When a
spouse has died they are stated as loss of: companionship and society;
services; care and attention; protection; advice; earnings; mainte-
nance; support; and the reasonable expenses to be incurred by the sur-
viving spouse for the care of the children.22
21 But see Estes v. Schulte, 146 Wash. 688, 264 Pac. 990 (1928) where a recovery
exceeding the amount of decedent's past contributions to his surviving older sister,
extended throughout the period of her life expectancy, was affirmed. The court indi-
cated that the jury might have properly thought that her expenses would have increased
with her advancing age and that the deceased would have underwritten those increased
costs. Apparently evidence of the survivor's physical condition is pertinent if it may
be inferred that the decedent would have responded to the increased cost of mainte-
nance. See also Heath v. Stephens, 144 Wash. 440, 258 Pac. 321 (1927) where evidence
of a child's injuries received in the same accident that caused his parent's death was held
improperly admitted, and Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190
Pac. 1007 (1920), where the court erroneously considered the financial condition of
the beneficiaries in apportioning a settlement.
22 Of course no instruction has been found which includes all of these elements.
Some elements overlap others and a concise statement seems preferable.
[VOL.. 35
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The statement of the above elements should enlighten the attorney
on the interpretation which has been placed on the phrase "pecuniary
loss." The word pecuniary is recognized as not being used with its
normal connotations. The court has not been so materialistic as to limit
compensation entirely to the loss of purely tangible contributions of
money, property, shelter, and food. In valuing a life the court has felt
justified in allowing the jury to place a monetary amount on the ma-
terial intangible contributions which constitute the basis and core of
the familial relationship. The Washington court, contrary to the ma-
jority view, appears to allow damages for loss of society.23 No one
would deny the valuable nature of these intra-family benefits and most
would agree that they are inherent elements in the truly compensatory
award. The problem arises in guarding against speculative damages
when such intangibles must be translated into dollars. Judge Weaver,
speaking for the court, recently remarked, "No phase of the law of
damages is in such an unsatisfactory state as that concerned with the
rule governing damages for wrongful death."24 As long as placing value
on human life in terms of loss to surviving relatives is attempted this
"unsatisfactory state" will remain. However, it is a monument to our
legal system that the injustice of the common law rule was unanimously
recognized and "damages of a character which, although real, were
theretofore not the subject of judicial computation and could not be
allowed or estimated by any exact rule of mathematical calculation"25
are now awarded.
Where the deceased was the head of the family the estimated value
of that portion of his earnings which he would have contributed to his
family during his life expectancy will likely be the principal element of
damages. Where the facts allow the increased value of his potential
earnings over his present earnings may be shown by evidence of his
prospects of advancement in his employment and the commensurate
increase in financial return.2
In establishing a reasonable expectation of benefits from the de-
28 Hinton v. Carmody, 182 Wash. 123, 45 P.2d 32 (1935) ; Davis v. North Coast
Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 295 Pac. 921 (1931); contra, Walker v. McNeill, 17
Wash. 582, 50 Pac. 488 (1897). The court sometimes strains in emphasizing the "pe-
cuniary" loss of society. Felt v. Puget Sound Elec. Ry. 175 Fed. 477, 481 (9th Cir.
1909).24 Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43 Wn.2d 386, 395, 261 P.2d 692,
697 (1953).25 Philby v. Northern Pac. Ry., 46 Wash. 173, 175, 89 Pac. 468, 469 (1907).24Pearson v. Picht 184 Wash. 607, 52 P.2d 314 (1935). See Fogarty v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 85 Wash. 90, 147 Pac. 652 (1915), (an FELA action).
19601
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ceased, evidence of the family relationship is pertinent," and is especi-
ally desirable where an inference from the fact of a divided family unit
may be made which will minimize the expectations of surviving rela-
tives." Evidence that the deceased head of the family was unemployed,
immoral or improvident,29 or was habitually devoted to intoxicants"
may serve to reduce what would otherwise be a reasonable expectation
of economic benefits.
The potential receipt of an inheritance from the deceased has been
held to be outside the measure of damages."1 This holding seems ques-
tionable since the property which the deceased could be reasonably
expected to have accumulated throughout the remainder of his life and
left to the natural objects of his bounty is of a demonstrably more
tangible character than some other recognized elements of damage, and
appears to meet the pecuniary loss standard.32 The fact that the ex-
pected economic benefit is a death benefit rather than a contribution
during life is merely a difference in the form of conferring the benefit
without a distinction in substance, unless the survivor's life expectancy
is less than that of the deceased.
Funeral and burial expenses have consistently been allowed as an
element of damages"3 under the wrongful death statute although this
27 Clason v. Velguth, 168 Wash. 242, 11 P.2d 249 (1932); Walker v. McNeill, 17
Wash. 582, 50 Pac. 488 (1897).
28 Lund v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash. 254, 1 P2d 301 (1931) ; Creamer v. Moran
Bros. Co., 41 Wash. 636, 84 Pac. 592 (1906). But see Piland v. Yakima Motor Coach
Co., 162 Wash. 456 ,298 Pac. 419 (1931), where an interlocutory divorce decree ali-
mony award was relied upon to fix damages.
29 Rochester v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., 67 Wash. 545, 122 Pac. 23 (1912).
30Fleming v. City of Seattle, 45 Wn2d 477, 275 P.2d 904 (1954), (offer of eleven
justice court convictions for drunkenness was improperly refused). But see Lund-
berg v. Baumgartner, 5 Wn.2d 619, 106 P.2d 566 (1940), wherein the court stated that
proof of three instances of drunkenness within an eight month period before death
would not, standing alone without the daughter's testimony on frequent drinking, have
established a habit. The court also held that the fact that arrests were made was not
evidence of the asserted conduct and stated that since contributory negligence by
reason of intoxication was in issue the plaintiff would have been entitled to an in-
struction limiting consideration of the habitual drunkenness to the damages issue.
31 Rochester v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., 75 Wash. 559, 135 Pac. 209 (1913).
32 "An element of damage which is infrequently asserted in these cases, but which
seems properly allowable, is the present value of any additional accumulations which
the deceased would have made during the remainder of his life if he had not been
killed and which he could reasonably be expected to leave to his wife and children
eventually at his death." McCORMicK, DAMAGES 350 (1935) ; See National Airlines,
Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959) cert. denied 361 U.S. 885 (1959) ; see
also Martin v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 268 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1959), (decided under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act which measures damages by the pecuniary loss
to survivors).
3 Hinton v. Carmody, 182 Wash. 123, 45 P.2d 32 (1935) ; Castner v. Tacoma Gas
& Fuel Co., 126 Wash. 657, 219 Pac. 12 (1923). But see McMullen v. Warren Motor
Co., 174 Wash. 454, 25 P.2d 99 (1933) where funeral expenses were recovered by the
personal representative even though there were no statutory beneficiaries in existence.
See also Lamb v. Mason, 26 Wn.2d 879, 176 P.2d 342 (1947), where dictum seems to
indicate that the recovery for funeral expenses should insure to the benefit of the estate.
[VOL. 35
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item will not bear analysis under the previous statement of the pecuni-
ary loss to survivors standard for measuring damages.
Under the survival statute the principal damages recoverable are
medical expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of earnings, all computed
relative to the period between the injury and death. If this statute ac-
tually had the effect of perpetuating the deceased's personal injury
claim the above measure would constiute only partial compensation,
but this is a hybrid statute which establishes a concurrent remedy with
that under the wrongful death statute. If the decedent's loss of earning
capacity throughout the period of life expectancy were recoverable,
this would result in a double recovery since at least a portion of his
earning capacity is recoverable in the wrongful death action by the
same beneficiaries.
Loss of services. Upon the death of a child the measure of damages
differs, depending upon whether the action is brought under the wrong-
ful death or the child-death statute. When the decedent is a minor
ordinarily the action will be maintained under the latter statute"4 since
the parents are usually unable to show their dependency upon the child
for support. Under the child-death statute the measure of damages is
the value of the child's services from the time of injury to the pros-
pective date of reaching majority, less the cost of his support and main-
tenance during that period." This statute has been interpreted as
extending the common law right of a parent to recover for the loss of
services of his child during the period of minority when a personal in-
jury has impaired the child's earning power. Consequently, the recovery
for loss of services, upon the child's death, is extended throughout the
entire prospective period of minority.8 On the other hand, where the
statutory beneficiary can show that he is dependent upon the deceased
child for support, there is an election of remedies and suit under the
wrongful death statute will result in a recovery for loss of that sup-
port computed without regard to any remaining period of minority and
limited only by the anticipated duration of the continued support."
Few children are likely to be a financial asset to their parents dur-
ing minority and defendant's evidence on the necessary expenses of
- RCW 424.010.35 Atkeson v. Jackson Estate, 72 Wash. 233, 130 Pac. 102 (1913) aff'd on rehearing
74 Wash. 700, 134 Pac. 175 (1913) ; Hedrick v. Ilwaco R. & Nay. Co., 4 Wash. 400, 30
Pac. 714 (1892). As to distinction between statutes with reference to time limitation
see Kanton v. Kelly, 65 Wash. 614, 118 Pac. 890 (1911).36 Mesher v. Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 134 Pac. 1092 (1913).
87 Skeels v. Davidson, 18 Wn2d 358, 139 P.2d 301 (1943); Machek v. City of
Seattle, 118 Wash. 42, 203 Pac. 25 (1921).
1960]
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clothing, lodging and otherwise maintaining the child during minority,
together with testimony on the parents' intentions to educate the child
throughout this period, may serve to destroy any objective appraise-
ment of a net balance in favor of the parents. 8 In this sense, the
death might result in a purely economic benefit to the parents. None-
theless, the court has consistently allowed substantial damages to be
recovered39 and has further held that there need be no proof of spe-
cial damages since this would be impracticable if not impossible in the
case of young children."0
The disparity between the measure of damages and the results of
the cases caused an extended discussion in Skeels v. Davidson," after
which the court concluded that, although it was common knowledge
that damages could not be objectively assessed in most cases, the child-
death statute evinced a public policy in favor of awarding substantial
damages in all cases where the child's death was caused by the de-
fendant's wrongful conduct. The court stated that the damages rule
is liberalized because of necessity, but it is submitted that in fact it
has been destroyed and replaced by the court's statement of public
policy. 2 The statement of policy is no doubt correct and is probably
applicable to the entire wrongful death statutory scheme. The prob-
lem of guarding against speculative damages is now the focal point
for inquiry.
Funeral and burial expenses are recoverable under the child-death
statute, although the theory of compensation is not stated, and medi-
cal expenses appear to be recoverable although there is no related
survival statute.43
In proving damages, photographs of the child are admissible for the
38 Apparently this occurred in Kramer v, Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43
Wn.2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953).
39 Atkeson v. Jackson Estate, 72 Wash. 233, 130 Pac. 102 (1913) (recovery of $1,000
although parents intended to underwrite the infant's education throughout his minor-
ity; the court referred to the "probability" that the family might suffer adversity and
therefore have need for and require the child's services for monetary gain). See Scholz
v. Leuer, 7 Wn.2d 76, 109 P.2d 294 (1941).
40 Sweeten v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 88 Wash. 679, 153 Pac. 1054 (1915)
Atrops v. Costello, 8 Wash. 149, 35 Pac. 620 (1894). But see Mieske v. P.U.D. No. 1,
42 Wn.2d 871, 259 P.2d 647 (1953) where the court indicated that merely the proof
of age, general intelligence and health, and energetic qualities woud not be sufficient to
support a $10,000 award for the death of a 5 year old girl.
41 18 Wn.2d 358, 139 P.2d 301 (1943).
42 In Northern Pac. Ry. v. Everett, 232 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1956) the court upheld
an award of more than $8,000 for the death of a 16 year old girl, after restating the
measure of damages and the rule of substantial damages where death is negligently
caused.
43 Swenland v. Gregory, 118 Wash. 640, 240 Pac. 597 (1922) ; Hedrick v. Ilwaco
R. & Nay. Co., 4 Wash. 400, 30 Pac. 714 (1892).
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purpose of establishing his health and physical condition," as is evi-
dence of the child's industriousness5 and testimony concerning spe-
cial services which it was anticipated that the child would render."
Of course any evidence which may touch on the child's earning power
is material. 7
APPLICATION OF MEASURE
Dependency. There are two classes of beneficiaries under the wrong-
ful death statute. The surviving spouse and children compose the first
class. Members of the second class, viz., parents, sisters, and minor
brothers, only have a cause of action when the decedent left no sur-
viving spouse or children48 and then must prove dependency upon the
decedent for support as a prerequisite to recovery." This requirement
serves a double purpose in that its satisfaction establishes the neces-
sary proof on the damage issue. Dependency for the purpose of main-
taining a cause of action is sufficient to entitle the claimant to sub-
stantial damages." Partial dependency is sufficient but it must be
"substantial."
The test to determine substantial dependency requires a need by
the claimant, which amounts to an actual inability to support himself,
coupled with a substantial financial recognition of that need by the
decedent, thereby resulting in a reasonable expectation of continued
support." Contributions which may be characterized as casual gifts
44 Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43 Wn.2d. 386, 261 P.2d 692
(1953).
4 5 Atrops v. Costello, 8 Wash. 149, 35 Pac. 620 (1894).
4 Tecker v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., 60 Wash. 570, 111 Pac. 791 (1910), (where blind
father intended to use his son as a guide).
4 7 Kranzusch v. Trustee Co., 93 Wash. 629, 161 Pac. 492 (1916) (even though wit-
ness was experienced in only one occupation).4 8 Joski v. Short, 1 Wn.2d 454, 96 P.2d 483 (1939).
49 ebr of the first class, such as adult children, need not prove dependency.
Reamer v. Griffiths, Inc., 158 Wash. 665, 291 Pac. 714 (1930) ; Jensen v. Culbert, 134
Wash. 599, 236 Pac. 101 (1925) ; contra, Castner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co., 123 Wash.
236, 212 Pac. 283 (1923) (failing to distinguish between the pecuniary loss and de-
pendency requirement).
50 Where actions under the wrongful death and survival statutes were joined, having
been brought for the benefit of deceased's parent, and the jury granted an award under
the survival statute action but not under the wrongful death statute, the inconsistent
verdict was properly set aside and a new trial ordered on both actions. Mitchell v Rice,
183 Wash. 402, 48 P.2d 949 (1935).
5
.Bortle v. Northern Pac. Ry., 60 Wash. 552, 111 Pac. 780 (1910) (adult son not
living with parents sporadically contributed about $100 per year to his father who
earned a small salesman's commission; court held payments to be gifts and father's
low income the result of lack of effort, not inability). In Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wash.
234, 93 P.2d 376 (1939) recovery was allowed where an adult defrayed a portion of




do not achieve the required status. In Mitchell v. Rice," the court
held dependency to be an issue for the jury, after recognizing the
facts as presenting a borderline situation. In that case the deceased
adult son had been intermittently employed at a low salary and had
made very small contributions to his father who held several proper-
ties which were not then profitable due to depressed market conditions.
Dependency must be based upon an existing situation and not upon
a promise to make contributions at some future time." But once de-
pendency is found to exist, apparently the possibility of increased de-
pendency in the future may be considered.54
Division of award. When there is a settlement of a wrongful death
claim or the judgment does not specify what portion of the total award
is allocable to each beneficiary, the probate court will exercise its jur-
isdiction and apportion the recovery between the beneficiaries." Ini-
tially there was some dispute whether allowing the jury to make the
allocation was prejudicial error because the jury's sympathy was
aroused,5" but such an argument was never upheld" and it is now the
common practice to require the jury to make the appropriate alloca-
tion." It is the better view that the injury to the familial interest
and consequent loss to each beneficiary is separate and distinct and
should be so viewed by the jury in its deliberations.5
Life expectancy. Life expectancy is the common measuring rod
used to determine the duration of a survivor's reasonable expectations
of pecuniary benefit. The measuring life is that of the deceased unless
the survivor is older than the deceased. Mortality tables are used as
evidence of the appropriate person's life expectancy and in Bradshaw
v. City of Seattle,"0 where other evidence of life expectancy was the
sole basis for computation, the trial court was admonished to use the
Insurance Commissioner's 1941 Standard Ordinary Table of Mor-
52 183 Wash. 402, 48 P.2d 949 (1935).
53 Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 145 Wash. 31, 258 Pac. 842 (1927), (the court
noted that it would be unusual to find a normal child who would not promise to support
his parents in their old age).
54 Estes v. Schulte, 146 Wash. 688, 264 Pac. 990 (1928).
55 Hansen v. Stimson Mill Co., 195 Wash. 621, 81 P.2d 855 (1938); Schultz v.
Western Farm Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190 Pac. 1007 (1920).
56 Stephenson v. Parton, 89 Wash. 653, 155 Pac. 147 (1916).
67 Heath v. Stephens, 144 Wash. 440, 258 Pac. 321 (1927).
58Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43 Wn.2d 386, 261 P.2d 692
(1953) ; Hinton v. Carmody, 182 Wash. 123, 45 P.2d 32 (1935).
59 Fogarty v. Northern Pac. Ry., 74 Wash. 397, 133 Pac. 609 (1913) (an FELA
action).
6043 Wn.2d 766, 264 P.2d 265 (1953).
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tality. More recently published tables are also utilized.6 Of course
mortality tables are little more than a guide in determining the. life
expectancy of a particular individual since the tables are based upon
the average life expectancy of persons in the same age bracket.
Life expectancy is just a measuring rod. Any evidence that has
probative value in determining the duration of a survivor's reasonable
expectations of pecuniary benefit is admissible.62 When valuing pros-
pective earnings lost to the survivors no Washington case has made
any distinction between "earning expectancy" and life expectancy by
way of differentiating between the prolonged ability to confer a pe-
cuniary benefit and prolonged life in a time sense.6" Perhaps pension
and other retirement plans largely fill whatever gap might exist.
Once the duration of expected future benefits is found and those
benefits have been valued the court must instruct the jury that this
amount must be discounted to its present value. The rate of discount
to be used in this computation is not the legal rate of interest but that
rate which could fairly be expected on safe investments which a per-
son of ordinary prudence, but without particular financial experience
or skill, could make in the locality."' The determination of the dis-
count rate to be applied is a question of fact for the jury to decide
upon the evidence presented in accordance with the above standard."
Excessive awards. The difficulties inherent in mathematically com-
puting the value of a person's life in terms of his survivors has resulted
in this inexact process being continuously questioned on appeal on the
ground that the damages awarded are excessive. The inadequate award
" See Immel, Actuarial Tables and Damage Awards, 19 Oio ST. L. J. 240 (1958).
62-In Rochester v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., 67 Wash. 545, 122 Pac. 23 (1912), evidence
of bad health was stated as a factor which could operate to preclude the jury from
considering any damages for the benefit of the surviving child after reaching majority
on the ground that such an assessment would be based on mere conjecture. Without
such evidence a child's pecuniary loss is not necessarily limited to the minority period.
Lund v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash. 254, 1 P.2d 301 (1931). Aronson v. City of Everett,
136 Wash. 312, 239 Pac. 1011 (1925) is not authority to the contrary since the plaintiff
voluntarily limited his damage claim to the minority period. But see dissent, believed
to be erroneous, in Piland v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 162 Wash. 456, 298 Pac. 419
(1931).
6s "The probability is that a man fifty-eight years of age will, during the rest of his
life, suffer first a reduction in his earnings and then some considerable time before his
death a termination of his employment.... [T]he cost of his maintenance and the bur-
den of his care will continue or quite probably become greater. . . ." MacValee v.
United States, 81 F.Supp. 372, 377 (W.D. Wash. 1948) (action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act).
04Kellerher v. Porter, 29 Wn.2d 650, 189 P.2d 223 (1948), noted 28 WAsH. L. REV.
283 (1948), with regard to the point discussed.
6 5 Wentz. v. T. E. Connolly, Inc., 45 Wn.2d 127, 275 P.2d 585 (1954).
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has also been recognized both under the wrongful death6" and the child-
death statutes."7
Before 1933 enough awards had resulted in a conditional or un-
conditional grant of a new trial that an appeal on this ground must
certainly have been the subject of thoughtful consideration by every
unsuccessful defendant. In that year the concept of the excessive
award was extensively discussed in Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto
Freight, Inc.6" by a court which noticed its failure to spell out its think-
ing in previous cases where recoveries were deemed excessibe. The
test which the truly excessive award must meet, in the absence of af-
firmative evidence that the jury's sympathy was improperly incited, is
that of a comparison between the evidence and the amount of recovery
which shocks the conscience of the judges. Only then will the exist-
ence of passion or prejudice in the jury's verdict be indicated un-
mistakenly.69 The wide latitude given to the jury in this area will
probably be most evident in cases where the deceased was not the
family's bread-winner since the court noted that the risk of uncer-
tainty should be borne by its creator.
While the court did not state a new black-letter rule, it is submit-
ted that its discussion is of great utility as delineating its subjective
approach to a subjectve problem which has been faced and similarly
decided by many courts, and may relieve some congestion in our ap-
pellate court without injustice to litigants.
DAVID C. CUMMINS
66 Olson v. King County, 188 Wash. 334, 62 P.2d 719 (1936) (award of $6,400 raised
to $11,400) ; Pearson v. Picht, 184 Wash. 607, 52 P.2d 314 (1935) ($1,500 award
raised on appeal to $11,500) ; Danielson v. Carstens Packing Co., 115 Wash. 516, 197
Pac. 617 (1921) (grant of new trial on ground of inadequacy upheld), 121 Wash. 645,
210 Pac. 12 (1922) (affirming award made at second trial).
67 Skidmore v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 244 Pac. 545 (1926) (increasing
award from $1,200 to $2,500).
68 43 Wn.2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953) (recovery of $50,000 general damages for the
death of a wife and mother of an infant was affirmed).
69 A reference to lower awards given in other cases for the purpose of comparison
will often be somewhat countered by judicial notice of the dollar's decreased purchasing
power. Sasse v. Hale Morton Taxi & Auto Co., 139 Wash. 359, 246 Pac. 940 (1926);
Allison v. Bartelt, 121 Wash. 418, 209 Pac. 863 (1922).
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